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A Collective Performance-based Contract for Point-Nonpoint Source Pollution Trading 
 
 
Nonpoint sources are currently the leading cause of water pollution in most areas of the 
United States (Davies and Mazurek, 1997).  Yet, they have avoided intense regulatory scrutiny 
until fairly recently, due perhaps to the long-standing claim that regulation is impractical 
because it is inherently difficult to identify individual contributions to nonpoint source 
pollution loads.  The result is that nonpoint sources, such as agriculture, have traditionally been 
addressed through voluntary subsidy programs that compensate for the adoption of best 
management practices (BMPs).  This tradition has continued in the development of water 
quality trading (WQT) markets, where nonpoint source participation is voluntary.  As a result, 
WQT markets differ from traditional pollution permit markets, in that point sources are always 
buyers, nonpoint sources are always sellers.  In this sense, WQT markets are similar to a public 
procurement or contracting programs, with the point source seeking to contract with multiple 
nonpoint sources to jointly produce a desired level of pollution abatement. 
 
Collective performance-based WQT contracts are complicated by the existence of both 
adverse selection and moral hazard.  However, this is not a problem unique to WQT trading.  
For example, any government that wishes to contract private firms for major public works 
projects (i.e., construction of highways or dams) must confront similar informational 
asymmetries.  In practice, governments have designed various contracting mechanisms that 
address both adverse selection (the government does not know the expected cost of any firm) 
and moral hazard (the government cannot observe the selected firm’s effort to keep its realized 
production costs low).   
 
What sets the WQT market problem apart is the need to contract jointly with multiple 
nonpoint sources, coupled with the inability to observe individual productivity.  The term 
“moral hazard in teams” was coined by Holmstrom (1982) to describe this problem.  Moral 
hazard in teams is more pervasive than moral hazard in the single-agent case, as it can occur 
even when there is no uncertainty in output.  Since shirking in effort is only detected through 
the common final product, the effect of individual shirking is spread across all agents in the 
group, and cannot be attributed to the responsible party.  In this sense, moral hazard in teams is 
a type of “free-rider” problem prevalent in the provision of public goods.   
 
Even though the actions of the agents are not observable, and so cannot be used as the basis 
of the contract, the result of the individual actions is verifiable as collective abatement at the 
end of the period.  Therefore, to overcome the moral hazard in teams problem, the collective 
abatement outcome must be included in the contract that stipulates payment to the agents.  A 
successful contract must pay more when the observable collective performance is a good signal 
that the individual abatement choices were the required ones. The contract offered by the 
principal must make each agent feel responsible for the whole of the final product, in order to 
provide the appropriate incentive for overcoming the free-rider problem. 
 
This paper focuses on the contract design issues associated with the asymmetric 
information problems inherent in nonpoint source pollution abatement.  When a point source 
offers a contract for nonpoint source pollution abatement several informational problems pose  2
obstacles to success.  Nonpoint sources have different abilities (i.e., abatement types) in terms 
of the cost of reducing emissions.  The point source cannot observe the expected abatement 
costs of particular nonpoint sources, and therefore, does not know which firms are the most 
efficient trading partners.  In addition, each nonpoint source is better informed regarding its 
own unique abatement production process, and therefore holds private information regarding its 
actual contribution to observed levels of aggregate loadings.  
 
3.1    Existing Literature on Collective Monitoring and Enforcement 
 
  Economists have addressed the issue of moral hazard in teams through a wide array of 
collective monitoring and enforcement mechanisms.  Issues of joint production in the labor 
literature (Holmstrom, 1982; Rasmussen, 1987; McAfee and McMillan, 1991) have been 
extended to address the joint production problems in nonpoint source pollution control (Meran 
and Schwalbe, 1987; Segerson, 1988; Xepapadeas, 1991; Cabe and Herriges, 1992; Bystrom 
and Bromley, 1998, Pushkarskya, 2003).  The primary goal of all of these mechanisms is to 
provide appropriate production incentives to the individual agents by making each of them 
liable for the whole team output. 
 
  Segerson (1988) applies Holmstrom’s (1982) analysis of moral hazard in teams to the 
problem of nonpoint source pollution, by proposing an ambient tax/subsidy mechanism based 
on collective monitoring and enforcement.  This mechanism pays each individual a firm 
specific subsidy, or charges each individual a firm-specific tax, based on the difference 
between observed levels of aggregate pollution and the collective standard.  The team contract 
that I propose is a variation of the contracts proposed by Segerson (1988) and Holmstrom 
(1982), modified to allow for utilization in a voluntary trading setting.  A more unique 
contribution is the use of a team-entry auction to overcome some of the more onerous 
information requirements of the principal.   
  
While collective performance-based instruments are appealing in terms of their 
theoretical efficiency properties, their adoption as practical policy tools has not occurred.  A 
criticism of collective-performance mechanisms is that they require the principal to possess too 
much information for efficient implementation in practice.  In particular, these mechanisms 
require the principal, traditionally thought to be a regulatory agency, to have perfect 
information regarding nonpoint source abatement production and cost functions.  It is also 
expected that nonpoint sources know their own abatement production and cost functions, as 
well as their impact on aggregate loadings.    
 
  Assuming that the required contracting information is privately known by the nonpoint 
sources, practical implementation of collective performance-based mechanisms requires 
dealing with an adverse selection problem.  Pushkarskya (2003) addresses the role of adverse 
selection in the design of a nonpoint source pollution abatement subsidy program.  The 
principal (i.e., the regulatory agency) faces both moral hazard in teams and adverse selection.  
The regulator wishes to target subsidy payments to the farmers that can produce the most 
abatement at the least-cost with collective performance as the only verifiable contract element.  
A key assumption in this research is that each farmer has perfect information regarding not 
only their own abatement cost function, but the abatement cost functions of all other farmers.   3
Similar to Alchian and Demestz (1972) analysis of economic organization, the shared cost 
information of the nonpoint sources combined with the potential for economic gains through 
cooperation creates an incentive for the nonpoint sources to organize into a trading association.  
The formation of the trading association circumvents the adverse selection problem, as the 
point source can contract directly with the association based on observable group abatement.  
This collective payment can then be divided by the association between individual members 
using the observable cost information to internally set optimal sharing rules.  The contract that I 
propose in this chapter relaxes the information assumption in Pushkarskya (2003).  The 
contract implements a collective performance-based contract where nonpoint sources only 
know their own abatement cost function with certainty. 
 
3.2  A Model of a Two-stage Team Contract for Water Quality Trading 
 
  In this section, a two-stage mechanism that pairs a traditional team contract for the 
control of moral hazard in teams with an auction to determine team membership prior to 
contracting is examined.  The task at hand is to design a collective performance-based contract 
that has the potential for actual implementation.  The contract must transmit to group members 
clear and readily comprehensible incentives that are consistent with the group’s goals of 
pollution abatement.  This means that both incentive compatibility and simplicity, which can be 
in conflict, are both valued.   
 
In the first stage, multiple nonpoint sources are offered the opportunity to participate in 
a team contract to produce an aggregate level of abatement, using a sealed bid auction.  Bids 
consist of the quantity of annual pollution reduction the individual pledges to produce, and the 
corresponding per unit price.  The point source accepts the bids of the individuals that, as a 
group, offer to produce the desired level of nutrient reductions at the lowest cost.   The point 
source will select the group of bidders that, as a team, can reduce the maximum amount of 
pollution within the point source’s fixed budget constraint.  The point source’s budget 
constraint is determined by its own abatement cost function.  Simply put, the point source will 
not spend more than it would cost to directly abate the same amount of pollution.  In the second 
stage, the nonpoint sources will produce abatement.  At the end of the second stage, the 
collective nonpoint source abatement is realized and participating nonpoint sources are 
compensated based on the conditional payment schedule. The selected team is then paid 
according to an “all or nothing” contract based on observed levels of aggregate nonpoint source 
pollution.  If the observed level of collective nonpoint source pollution reductions is greater 
than or equal to the contracted group level, each team member is paid for their bid quantity at 
some agreed upon per-unit price equal to the lowest price bid offered by a non-team member.
1  
However, if the observed level of collective nonpoint source pollution reduction is less than the 
aggregate quantity, each team member is paid nothing (and suffers a loss equal to the costs of 
abatement produced). 
  
The use of an auction mechanism to select the contracting team members creates 
incentives for nonpoint sources to truthfully reveal private abatement cost information.  This 
                                                 
1 The price is dependent upon the auction design chosen.  Under a discriminatory price auction the 
contract price will be the bid price, and under a uniform price auction the contract price will be equal to 
the lowest of the non-team members’ bid prices.  4
serves two purposes.  First, the point source can avoid the adverse selection problem by 
offering a menu of contracts based on the revealed information.  Second, the bid information 
allows the point source to set optimal sharing rules that ensure that the participation constraints 
of team members are met.  This overcomes the traditional criticism regarding the high 
informational requirements for efficient team contracts.  The role of the team contract is to 
deliver the appropriate incentives to reduce potential shirking (i.e., abating less than the bid 
quantity). 
 
  This contract allows the point source to purchase a given level of nonpoint source 
pollution reduction, while leaving nonpoint sources their choice of abatement technology to 
reduce their pollution discharges.  Uncertainty as to the effectiveness of on-site abatement 
technology is borne by the nonpoint sources, which have better information regarding 
abatement performance, and are best able to handle it.  The competition for team membership 
effectively limits the range of rent seeking possibilities in nonpoint source bid prices, while 
endogenously providing the point source with the information needed to set the optimal sharing 
rules within the contract. 
 
  Consider a watershed that consists of a single, risk neutral point source and multiple, n, 
risk neutral nonpoint sources.  A subset of the nonpoint sources, n m ≤ , (i.e., the “team”) are 
selected to provide individually unverifiable levels of abatement,  ] , 0 [
max
i i a a ∈ .  Each nonpoint 
source has a finite capacity for abatement, 
max
i a .  The cost of abatement is given by a strictly 
increasing convex cost function,  ) ( i i a C .  The team’s aggregate abatement, ) , ( e a A , depends 
stochastically on the individual abatement actions of the nonpoint sources and random weather 
effects.  Expected team abatement is denoted as: [] ∑∑
==
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whereω  and  ω − 1  are the probabilities of good and bad weather respectively() 1 0 < <ω , and 
e + 1  and  e − 1  represent the impact of good and bad weather respectively() 1 0 < < e .  Any 













E.   The principal offers an “all-or-nothing” team contract that makes individual 
payments contingent on the monitoring of team performance.  The team target Λ is the sum of 







λ .  If  the 
observed level of aggregate nonpoint source pollution abatement is greater than or equal to the 
team target, individual team members receive a positive payment.  However, if aggregate 
nonpoint source pollution abatement is less than the team target, payments are withheld from 
each team member.  Table 1 defines the notation used throughout this chapter.  
 
  5
Table 1 – Model Notation 
 
Variable  Definition 
ω   Probability of good weather 
1-ω  Probability of bad weather 
) 1 0 ( : ≤ ≤ e e   Weather shock 
1+e  Impact of good weather on NPS abatement 
1-e  Impact of bad weather on NPS abatement 
n  Total number of NPS in watershed 
) ( : n m m ≤   Total number of NPS in team contract 
i λ   Quantity of NPS abatement production bid by agent i 
i p  Price per unit of NPS abatement bid by agent i 
∑ = = Λ
m
i i 1λ   Total quantity of NPS abatement contracted from team 


























: ) , (   Quantity of NPS abatement observed in good weather and 
bad. 
) ( i i a C  Agent i’s NPS abatement cost function 
 
 
3.3  A Budget-breaking Team Contract to Avoid Moral Hazard in Teams 
 
  
As mentioned previously, the proposed WQT contract must confront the combined effects 
of adverse selection and moral hazard on WQT contract design.  However, I will begin with an 
analysis of moral hazard in teams, in isolation, before including adverse selection.  Within this 
section, it is assumed that the point source knows the efficiency type of each nonpoint source 
(i.e., the point source knows the abatement cost functions of all nonpoint sources).  This allows 
the point source to select the optimal combination of low-cost trading partners and the optimal 
sharing rules, without the auction.   
 
The point source offers individualized contracts of the following type: 
   
  e) A(a,   if 0












.  The symbols  i p  and  i λ  represents the price paid per unit of 
abatement to nonpoint source i, and the quantity of abatement contracted from nonpoint source 
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π .  Therefore, the point source can set 
i p and  i λ , such that when the target is achieved each team member earns profit, and when the 
target is not met each team member suffers a loss.  Because nonpoint source market  6
participation is voluntary, the point source must be concerned with meeting each individual’s 
participation constraint.  The point source in this case must set the contract price and quantity 
in order to ensure that each nonpoint source will be made no worse off by participating 
optimally within the contract. 
 
The participation constraint requires that the payment to each nonpoint source must be 
greater than or equal to their actual costs of abatement, i.e.,  ) (
*










≥ .  The right hand side of this inequality is an “adjusted” average 
abatement cost.  Since the point source does not observe the individual abatement decision of 
the nonpoint sources, actual abatement, i a , can be greater than, less than, or equal to the 
contract quantity, i λ .  Thus, the break-even condition of price greater than average cost must be 
adjusted to take the potential discrepancy between actual and contracted quantities of 
abatement.  The point source will offer a price that guarantees the nonpoint source will, at a 
minimum, breakeven when producing the desired level of abatement.  Under voluntary 
participation, the breakeven condition is identical to the participation condition.  The concept of 
adjusted average cost is used throughout the remainder of the chapter for this reason.  
 
In order to explicitly include the effects of weather events on the profit maximizing 
decision of the nonpoint source, I write the expected profit function: 
  () () ( )
() () ( ) .   1   ) 1 (
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This represents the expected profit of nonpoint source i, given the choice of abatement level, ai.  
The conditional payment structure of the team contract is captured through the use of the 
indicator function, () ⋅ I .  When the condition inside the indicator function holds, total observed 
abatement meets or exceeds the group target, and the value of the indicator function is equal to 
one.  Otherwise, the value of the indicator function is equal to zero.  The first portion of the 
objective function, α, represents the expected profit in good weather conditions.  Good weather 
occurs with probability ω, and increases the level of collective abatement observed downstream 
by (1+e).  The second portion of the objective function, β, represents the expected profit in bad 
weather conditions.  Bad weather occurs with probability (1-ω), and decreases the level of 
collective abatement observed downstream by (1-e). 
  7
The Nash equilibrium abatement strategy maximizes the expected profit of each nonpoint 
source.  The discrete weather distribution assumption allows for analysis of the nonpoint source 
abatement decision under three weather/payment contingent scenarios (Table 1).
2    
 





1  Collective target met 
() 1   = ⋅ I 
Collective target met 
() 1   = ⋅ I 
2  Collective target met 
() 1   = ⋅ I 
Collective target not met 
() 0   = ⋅ I 
3  Collective target not  met 
() 0   = ⋅ I 
Collective target not met 
() 0   = ⋅ I 
 
 
Within the first scenario is one has the nonpoint sources choose the optimal abatement 
strategy that ensures a payment in both weather states.  The second scenario has the nonpoint 
sources choose the optimal abatement strategy to ensure payment is met only in the event of 
good weather.  The third scenario has the nonpoint sources choose to miss the target and forgo 
payment in both states of weather.  Once the optimal strategies under each scenario are 
determined the Nash abatement strategy can be determined.  
 










≥ , ensuring that the individual rationality constraint of each team member is 
met.  The  abatement production strategy 






 is the expected profit maximizing 
strategy that guarantees a profit in both good and bad weather.     
 







be the abatement production strategy for all nonpoint sources j ≠ i, 
who were selected into the team.  Nonpoint source i’s profit maximizing choice of abatement is 
determined by maximizing expected utility: 
                                                 
2 We do not consider the combination where there is a positive payout in bad weather and a zero 
payment in good weather as this is not feasible using a single abatement strategy.  8
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λ λ ω β
λ λ ω α
β α
. Eq  (3.1) 
 
  The nonpoint source seeks the abatement strategy that guarantees payment regardless of 
weather effects, i.e., the collective abatement target is met in both good and bad weather.  This 
is equivalent to choosing the expected profit maximizing level of abatement that guarantees 
1 ) ( = ⋅ I  in both (α) and (β).  I begin by solving the contents of both indicator functions.  
 
































































































































































































The abatement strategy that will achieve the target in both weather states is the strategy that 
produces the larger amount of abatement.   







 is the production strategy that produces more 
abatement (i.e., guarantees that the collective target is met in both weather states).    9
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is the preferred strategy abatement strategy.  The final step is to show 
that this expected profit maximizing strategy will hold as equality. 
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 holds with equality.  Any additional abatement 
will increase costs but will not change the expected revenue.    
QED 
 
This same process needs to be repeated to determine the optimal abatement strategies for the 
two remaining weather/payment contingent scenarios. 
 










≥ , ensuring that the individual rationality constraint of each team member is  10
met.  The abatement production strategy 






 is the expected profit maximizing strategy 
when the collective target is achieved in good weather but not in bad weather.     
 
 














≥ , ensuring that the individual rationality constraint of each team member is 
met.  The abatement production strategy  0 = i a  is the expected profit maximizing strategy 
when the collective target is achieved in good weather but not in bad weather.     
 
PROOF: The proof is identical to that of PROPOSITION 1 and is omitted for the sake of 
brevity. 
 
These abatement strategies can be labeled as self-insuring,  i i e a λ = − ) 1 ( , shirking, 
i i e a λ = + ) 1 ( , and non-participating, 0 = i a , strategies.  They represent the profit maximizing 
abatement strategies contingent on the weather/payment scenario.  The expected profit 
maximizing strategy among these choices is determined by the distribution of weather, the size 
of the weather shock, and the contract price and quantities.   
 
The self-insuring strategy has each nonpoint source producing more than their bid 
quantity so that the target is achieved regardless of weather.  The amount of overproduction 
equals the expected abatement shortfall that occurs under bad weather.  Expected profit under 
the self-insuring strategy is:  
[] () () ( ) () ( ) i i i i i i i i i i i i SI i a C e a p a C e a p a C e a p E − − = − − − + − − = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ω ω π  
  
The shirking strategy has each nonpoint source producing less than their bid quantity so 
that the aggregate abatement target is reached only in the event of good weather.  The amount 
of underproduction equals the expected level of the abatement windfall under good weather.  
Thus, shirking is constrained by the weather effect.  To avoid a loss the nonpoint source must 
produce enough to guarantee a payment in good weather.  Expected profit under the shirking 
strategy is: 
[] () () ( ) () ( ) ( ) i i i i i i i i i i S i a C e a p a C a C e a p E − + = − − + − + = ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 ( ω ω ω π . 
  
The non-participation strategy is the optimal abatement strategy when the target will not 
be achieved regardless of the weather.  In this situation, the expected revenue is equal to zero.  
Thus, the optimal response is to not produce any abatement, and thus not incur any costs.  The 
expected profit under the non-participating strategy is: 
[] () () ( ) () 0 0 ) 1 ( 0 = − − + − = i i NP i C C E ω ω π .  11
  









≥ , ensuring that the individual rationality constraint of each team member is 
satisfied.  The Nash equilibrium production strategy will be a self-insuring strategy, 
i i e a λ = − ) 1 (  , when  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( e e + > − ω , and will be a shirking strategy,  i i e a λ = + ) 1 (  , when 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( e e + < − ω . 
 
PROOF:  It is clear that the non-participating strategy cannot be the optimal strategy, when the 
participation constraint is met, since both the self-insuring and shirking strategy return positive 
levels of expected profit.  Therefore, the Nash equilibrium abatement strategy will be either 
self-insuring or shirking determined by the difference in expected profit: 
 
[] []
() ( ) ()
) 1 ( ) 1 (
) 1 ( ) 1 (
e e
a C e a p a C e a p
E E
i i i i i i i i
i SI i S
+ > −







When this condition holds, the self-insuring strategy returns higher expected profits than the 
shirking strategy, and vice versa. 
QED 
 
  These probabilities are common knowledge to the point source and all the nonpoint 
sources, and thus the Nash abatement strategy will be known as well.  This allows the point 
source to assign each team member’s contract price and quantity in order to maximize its own 
expected abatement cost savings.  Ideally the point source would like to set the contract prices 
and quantities as in Figure 1.  The contract price is set equal to the point source’s own marginal 
cost of abatement at the aggregate level of nonpoint source abatement being purchased.  This 
point is denoted as β in Figure 1.  In addition, the point source would choose to set the contract 
quantities of each team member equal to their economically efficient production levels, 
*
i i a = λ .   
 
However, from the previous analysis it is clear that the team contract will not produce 
this result.  If the Nash abatement strategy is shirking, the nonpoint source will under-produce 
abatement, and if the Nash abatement strategy is self-insuring the nonpoint source will 
overproduce abatement.  The point source must deviate from the first-best contract price in 
order to guarantee the contracted level of individual abatement is produced by each nonpoint 
source.  
  12





PROPOSITON 5: If  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( e e + > − ω , the point source will set the contract quantity at the 
first-best efficiency level  β λ |
*





 to ensure that the nonpoint source produces 
abatement  i i a λ =
* .  
 
PROOF: The nonpoint source will choose the self-insuring abatement strategy  i i e a λ = − ) 1 ( , 
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PROPOSITON 6: If  ) 1 ( ) 1 ( e e + < − ω , the point source will set the contract quantity at the 
first-best efficiency level  β λ |
*





 to ensure that the nonpoint source 
produces abatement  i i a λ =
* .  
 
PROOF: The nonpoint source will choose the shirking abatement strategy  i i e a λ = + ) 1 ( , 
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= β  which has the nonpoint source producing the 




  The point source is able to set the contract price such that the desired level of individual 
nonpoint source abatement is provided from each team member.  Figures 2 and 3 illustrate this 
for the self-insuring and shirking abatement strategies respectively.  In both cases, some level 
of informational rent is extracted by the nonpoint source due to the presence of asymmetric 
information, and the Nash abatement strategy is the one that provides the largest information 
rent to the nonpoint sources. 
 
These results, not surprisingly, are similar to those of the mechanisms proposed by 
Holmstrom (1982) and Segerson (1988).  This is because the team contract used in this chapter 
is a “special case” of the Holmstrom contract, which in turn is what the Segerson instrument is 








x x k x s




i ) (  
 
where,  i s  is the share of the collective output value (x) attributed to team member i, with  
1 = ∑i i s , and  0 > i k  is a fine for failing to achieve the contract level  ) (x .  The WQT contract 
presented in this chapter can be rewritten to correspond with this Holmstrom contract as 








x x k x s












and  Λ = p x .  The differences between the two contracts are in terms of  x  and 
i k .  In this contract the output value is fixed at the contracted level x .  In addition, the fine for 
under-compliance,  i k , is always set equal to the individual’s share of the fixed output value 
( x s k i i = ).  With these contract modifications, the principal seeking full compliance in the face 
of production uncertainty, will not seek to adjust the fine, as in Holmstrom and Segerson,  but 
instead will adjust the optimal value for output, i p .
3 
 
Figure 2: Second-Best Allocation of Contract Quantity and Price (Self-insuring 





                                                 
3 Changing the output value does affect the size of the fine, as it is the fine is equivalent to the loss of 
the individual share of total output value under non-compliance.  However, this is a direct result of the 
change in contract price.   15
Figure 3: Second-Best Allocation of Contract Quantity and Price (Shirking Abatement 




  A common problem often discussed in association with both the Holmstrom and 
Segerson instruments are the effects of endowment constraints.  Endowment constraints restrict 
the credibility of many collective performance instruments.  Under certain conditions, the size 
of fines required for full compliance may be so large as to eclipse the wealth of the individual 
agents.  In such settings, the mechanism loses its practical enforcement credibility (Karp, 
2002).  The same is true in the WQT setting, where the per unit price required to secure 
individual contract quantities may be prohibitively high, especially when weather impacts are 
large or when the difference in marginal abatement costs between point and nonpoint sources is 
small.  The budget constraint of the point source provides a default to nonpoint source trading.  
The point source can always opt to produce its own abatement at cost.  When the cost of 
contracting with nonpoint sources is too high, the budget constraint will exceeded and the 
proposed contract will not permit trading.  Unlike the Segerson and Holmstrom mechanisms, 
endowment constraints do not weaken the credibility of the contract incentives, rather they 
preclude trade from occurring at all.   
 
 
3.4  An Auction Mechanism to Determine Team Entry and Sharing Rules 
 
  When the assumption regarding the knowledge of individual nonpoint source abatement 
cost functions is relaxed, the point source no longer possesses the information needed to select 
efficient team members and set optimal sharing rules.  Introducing adverse selection requires 
the use of a mechanism that can induce the nonpoint sources to voluntarily reveal this private 
information.  Auctions are commonly used for this purpose, and among the wide array of 
auction designs, two types have generally received the most attention: uniform price and 
discriminating price, sealed-bid auctions (Harris and Raviv, 1981).  In a uniform price auction,  16
a single market price equal to the lowest rejected bid is paid to all accepted bidders.  In a 
discriminating auction all winning bidders are paid their bid price, rather than a common price.    
 
  The WQT setting presents some unique challenges regarding the appropriate choice of 
the auction mechanism.  Research on multi-unit auctions has shown that the efficiency 
conditions proven in the single-unit case are not guaranteed to hold when individual bidders 
offer multiple-units.  In particular, bid-shading in both uniform price and discriminating price 
auctions leads to inefficient allocation when bidders are allowed to bid for multiple units at 
differing prices, or when any bidder(s) can exert market power (Ausubel and Cramton, 2002).  
In the uniform case, the ability to bid for multiple quantities at differing prices can lead to a 
bidder’s own bid being “pivotal” in setting the price, and thus, truth revealing bids are no 
longer a dominant strategy.  Market power allows the dominant bidder to influence the auction 
price, in the discriminating price auction.   
 
  I assume that each nonpoint source has the same maximum capacity for abatement: 
max max max a a a j i = = , and thus will have a maximum, strategy contingent, bid 
quantity,
max max max λ λ λ = = j i .  This assumption removes the potential for market domination by 
any single bidder.  In addition, I restrict bidders to a single bid price over all bid quantities.  
This prevents any bidder’s bid from being pivotal in determining its own price in the uniform 
auction.  Under these assumptions, the inefficiencies of multi-unit auctions are avoided 
(Ausubel and Cramton, 2002). 
 
  In the team entry auction, a single risk-neutral point source desires to purchase Λ 
amount of nonpoint source abatement, subject to a budget constraint.  The budget constraint is 
determined by the point sources own abatement cost function (i.e., the point source will not pay 
more than its own cost for abatement).  Multiple risk neutral nonpoint sources, n, bid to join the 
abatement team.  The   n m ≤  nonpoint sources that collectively produce Λ level of abatement 
at the lowest-cost are chosen for team entry.  Bids consist of a per unit price, () i i p λ , for a 
quantity of abatement,  i λ .  Ties are broken through random selection.   
 
  Following Wilson (1979) and Ausubel and Cramton (2002), I represent the multi-unit 
auction in terms of shares, by normalizing the collective abatement target Λ=1, with individual 
quantity bids  ) , 0 (
max λ λ ∈ i , and  ) 1 , 0 (
max ∈ λ .  This simplifies the construction of order statistics 
needed for an analytical solution for optimal bidding strategies. 
 
  Order statistics are useful tools in the analysis of auctions.  The point source and all 
rival nonpoint sources assume that the reservation prices of all bidders() n θ θ ,..., 1  are identical 
independently drawn random variables from a cumulative density function  ) (⋅ G  with 
probability density function,  ) (⋅ g .  The distribution of reservation prices is known by all, but 
the individual realization  i θ  is only known to bidder i. 
 
  By arranging the n i.i.d. random reservation prices in ascending order of 
magnitude( ) ) ( ) 2 ( ) 1 ( ... n θ θ θ ≤ ≤ ≤ , we can denote the m













) (    the probability 
density function of the m
th order statistic.  Now the probability of being accepted into the team 
can be written as a function of the distribution of the m
th order statistic, 




m i i i i F p accepted p
− − − = < = ) ( 1 Pr Pr θ λ λ .   
 
  In the following sections, the same method is used to determine the optimal bid price 
and quantities for both possible Nash equilibrium abatement strategies.  To avoid repetition I 
will only report the details for the self-insuring strategy within the text.  The derivation of the 
optimal bid price and quantity under the shirking abatement strategy is identical to that 
presented.
4   
 
3.5  Uniform Price Team Entry Auction 
 
  In a uniform price auction the bidder faces uncertainty in regard to both team entry and 
the contract price.  The m lowest-priced bidders, that collectively bid to produce the team target 
( Λ = ∑
m
i
i λ ), are each contracted to produce their bid quantity at a per unit price equal to the 
lowest rejected bid.  The bid price of the lowest excluded bidder (m+1) becomes the contract 
price, referred to as the “stop-out” price, for all team members.  The “stop-out price”  ) ( 1 + m p is 
an expected price, over the distribution of the order statistic distribution,
i
m F
− − ) ( 1 .  As will be 






m m a C
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  Each nonpoint source will bid its true reservation price in the uniform price auction.  
Truth revelation implies that the bid will reflect the actual costs of abatement for the nonpoint 
source:  ( )
* * *) ( i i i i i a C a a p = .  Therefore, the nonpoint source bid price holds the following 







a p θ = =
*
*
*) ( .  The uniform price auction ensures 
that the individual rationality constraints of all accepted team members are met, as the contract 
price is always greater than the bid price of the team members.   
 
 
PROPOSITION 6: The competitive team entry auction is a revelation mechanism, which 








a p θ = =
*
*
*) ( . 
 
                                                 
4 The only difference between the self-insuring and shirking abatement strategies is in terms of the 
determination of optimal bid price and quantity is in the weather shock term.  Under the shirking 
abatement strategy ω (1+e) is used in place of (1-e).   18
PROOF:   To prove this proposition, it must be shown that deviating from the truth revealing 
bidding strategy does not improve the expected outcome for any bidder.  I will do this by 
showing that neither reducing the bid price below the reservation price, nor increasing the bid 
price above the reservation price, will improve the auction outcome for any nonpoint source 
bidder.  
  
When a bidder sets the bid price  ) ( i i p λ  lower than the reservation price i θ , three 
possible scenarios exist: 
. ) ( ) (
) ( ) (
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When the nonpoint source’s reservation price, i θ , is less than the expected competitive auction 
price,  1 + m p , as in scenario (a), decreasing the bid price ) ( i i p λ  has no effect.  The nonpoint 
source stays in the team and receives the same competitive price.  When  i φ  is greater than 
1 + m p , reducing the bid price can only make the nonpoint source worse off.  Reducing  ) ( i i p λ to 
any point greater than  1 + m p , as in scenario (b), does not gain the nonpoint source entry into the 
team, and its auction outcome is unchanged.  Setting  ) ( i i p λ  equal to or less than  1 + m p , as in 
scenario (c), worsens the auction outcome of the nonpoint source.  When  1 ) ( + = m i i p p λ , the 
nonpoint source has a random chance of being selected into the team.  If the nonpoint source 
does not gain entry into the team his status remains unchanged, and if selected the nonpoint 
source is guaranteed a loss because the auction price will be less than the average cost of 
abatement.  Reducing  ) ( i i p λ  below  1 + m p  exacerbates this loss. 
 
  When a bidder sets the bid price higher than the reservation price, three possible 
scenarios exist: 
). ( ) (
) ( ) (
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When the reservation price is greater than the stop-out price, as in scenario (c), increasing the 
bid price does not affect the auction outcome as the nonpoint source will continue to remain 
outside of the team.  When the reservation price is less than the stop-out price, the truth 
revealing bidding strategy ensures the nonpoint source entrance to the team.   Increasing the bid 
price to any point less than the stop-out price, as in scenario (d), has no effect on the auction 
outcome.  The nonpoint source remains in the team and will receive per unit stop-out price.  
Raising the bid price equal to or greater than stop-out price, as in situation (e) puts the nonpoint 
source in danger of suffering a loss.  Bidding the stop-price results in the nonpoint source 
having a random chance of being selected into the team.  If the nonpoint source is selected into 
the team the auction outcome remains the same, (i.e., he is paid the stop-price).  However, if 
not selected the nonpoint source suffers the loss of expected profit he would have made had he 
remained in the team.  Obviously, the same loss occurs for any bid price set above the stop-
price.  It is a dominant strategy for the nonpoint source to bid the reservation price associated 
with the chosen abatement strategy. 
QED 
  19
  The optimal bid price line is the average abatement cost curve.  Thus, the optimal bid 
price is simply the average cost of abatement at the optimal quantity level. 
 
PROPOSTION 7: In a uniform price auction, the nonpoint source will always bid the feasible 
quantity of abatement that maximizes expected profits, given the Nash abatement strategy. 
 
PROOF: The utility maximizing quantity of abatement under the self-insuring abatement 
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This maximization problem can be simplified as: 
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If the expected contract price is greater than the marginal cost of abatement, which is 
adjusted to account for the Nash abatement strategy, at the maximum allowable bid quantity 
(
max a ), the nonpoint maximizes expected profit by bidding this amount.  Otherwise, the 
nonpoint source will bid the quantity(
*
i a ) where the “stop-out” price equals the adjusted 
marginal cost of abatement.  The optimal bid quantity is the expected profit maximizing level: 
[ ]
* max * , min i i a a λ  
 QED 
  
The uniform price auction serves as a truth revelation mechanism, as the optimal bid 
price is equal to the average cost of abatement at the optimal bid quantity.  The optimal bid 
quantity is less than the first-best profit maximizing level as a result of informational rents from  20
asymmetric information.  The nonpoint source accounts for its abatement strategy of over-
production in its selection of its bid quantity.  However, the contract does ensure that each team 
member will produce individual abatement levels equal to their bid quantities.  The optimal 
bidding strategy is depicted graphically in Figure 4.   
 
Figure 4: Nonpoint Source Optimal Bid Price and Quantity (Uniform Price Auction and 





3.6  Discriminating Price Team Entry Auction 
  
In the discriminating auction, the bidder faces uncertainty about acceptance, but not 
about price.  The m lowest-priced bidders, that collectively bid to produce the team target 
( Λ = ∑
m
i
i λ ), are each contracted to produce their bid quantity at their bid price.   Thus, all 
bidders have an incentive to increase their bid price above the reservation price. 
 
 
PROPOSITION 8: In a discriminating price auction, the nonpoint source following a self-

















 and  []
* max , min i i a a = λ . 
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PROOF: The nonpoint source maximizes expected profit, where the expectation is now based 
on the uncertainty associated with being selected into the team
5, represented by the distribution 
of the m
th order statistic: 
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The maximization problem can be simplified as: 
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Solve nonpoint source profit maximization problem to determine optimal bidding strategy. 
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Rewriting the first order condition taken with respect to  i p condition shows the optimal price 
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.  Each bidder will inflate their bid above the reservation price 










) ( ) 1 (
 is the typical hazard function commonly 
found in problems of adverse selection.  The numerator is the probability of being selected into 
the team conditional on the bidder’s reservation price, and the numerator is the change in the 
probability of being selected into the team corresponding to a unit increase in bid price above 
the reservation price.  The greater the impact an increase in bid price has on the probability of 
                                                 
5 Weather uncertainty is incorporated into the choice of abatement strategy.  22
team entry, the smaller the overall informational rent.  Therefore, the nonpoint sources at the 
low-cost end of the distribution will extract greater informational rents than nonpoint sources at 
the high-cost end of the distribution.  The optimal bid price line is always greater than the 
average abatement cost ensuring that the individual rationality constraint is always met given 
the Nash abatement strategy.   
 
  The remaining first order condition provides the optimal quantity bidding strategy.  I 








































By substituting the optimal bid price line for i p  into the equation, the optimal bid quantity can 
be represented in terms of the relationship between the optimal bid price line and the marginal 

























































































When the optimal bid price line is greater than the marginal cost of abatement at the maximum 
bid quantity, the nonpoint source bids the maximum.  Otherwise, the nonpoint source will bid 
the expected profit maximizing quantity, where the optimal bid price line intersects the 
marginal cost of abatement curve (Figure 5).  
QED 
 
  Vickrey’s expected revenue equivalency of the uniform and discriminating price 
auction, under risk neutrality assumptions, have been well documented (Harris and Raviv, 
1981).  Traditionally, this has made the seller’s choice of auction design unimportant in terms 
of efficiency.  However, in the case of the team entry auction, market efficiency can be greatly 
affected by the choice of auction design.  Only the discriminating price auction can guarantee 
that the contract prices of all team members are consistent with the incentives necessary for 
Nash abatement production strategy. 
  
  The stability of the Nash equilibrium abatement strategy is dependent on the provision 
of the optimal contract price for each team member.  In the uniform price auction the optimal 
bid quantity is based on an expected contract price, which may not be the same as the realized 
contract price.  The only guarantee is that it will be greater than the winning bid prices.  
However, any contract price that differs from the expected price will result in each team 
member producing abatement at some quantity other than their bid quantity..  23
 
This problem does not arise in the discriminating price auction, where bid prices and 
quantities equal the contracted price and quantities for all winning bidders.  When actual draws 
from the distribution of the m
th order statistic differ from expectations, the affect is felt in the 
selection of team members.  Bidders who thought they would be included in the team can be 
left out, or those expecting to be left out of the team can be selected into the team.  In either 
case, there is no residual effect on the optimal provision of abatement from team members, 
since the bid price and quantity remain the contract bid and quantity for all nonpoint sources 
selected into the team, and it remains optimal for each to produce abatement equal to the bid 
level quantity. 
 
Figure 5: Nonpoint Source Optimal Bid Price and Quantity (Discriminating Price 





3.7  Conclusions 
 
The asymmetric information problems inherent in contracting for nonpoint source 
pollution abatement can be overcome using a collective performance contract.  A two-stage 
contract, which pairs a team entry auction with a budget breaking team contract can results in a 
stable abatement production equilibrium.  The point source must concede informational rents in 
order to achieve stability.  The amount of informational rent is dependent upon the distribution 
of weather impacts on abatement in the watershed.    24
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